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IN, THE SUPRE,ME COURT

of the
STATE Of UTAH
DYLE E. STONE,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

HURST LUMBER COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries whereby the
plaintiff was struck by an employee of the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury in the District Court
of Weber County, State of Utah, with the Honorable
John F. Wahlquist presiding. From a verdict and a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of One Thousand Seven Hundred Nine and no/100 ($1,709.00)
Dollars, the defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks for reversal of the trial court's
judgment and requests judgment in its favor as a matter
of law, or that failing, requests a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arose from an assault and battery by a
deliveryman, employed by the defendant lumber company, upon the plaintiff who was a foreman at a construction site.
On or about the 12th day of June, 1962, the defendant's employee, Marlin Morris, delivered a load of lumber
to a construction site where the plaintiff was employed.
When the employee of the defendant had finished unloading the said lumber, an argument arose between
the said employee and the plaintiff as to the abilities
of the deliveryman. The deliveryman struck the plaintiff
which caused the plaintiff some physical injury, with
the probability of a slight concussion, which did place the
plaintiff under a doctor's care for a period of time.
The defendant lumber company upon hearing of
the unauthorized act of its employee, immediately discharged the said employee Morris. The said employee of
defendant had only been in their hire from nine to twelve
days. His employment had been secured by the defendant
by contacting the Employment Security Office. The Employment Security Office knew of defendant's needs for
a driver-deliveryman. This understanding, was that the
defendant lumber company needed a deliveryman who
would not only perform as such, but who would also
make a good public representation in that said company
employed no outside salesmen. It was the contention of
the defendant company that they had no knowledge of
prior vicious nature of the employee nor any other problems with him during his nine to twelve day stay with
them. To support this, the president of the defendant
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company testified as to the employee's good nature and
was supported by other employees who had worked along
side the employee; their testimony gave support to the
good nature of the individual.
Plaintiff contends that defendant knew, or should
have known, that the employee of defendant was of a
vicious nature and temperament. In support of the
same, he offered testimony of plaintiff's brother who
claimed that one of defendant's employees said there had
been some trouble with the employee. There was also
testimony presented by the plaintiff, that a subsequent
employer had found the said employee to be hot-tempered,
but there was no evidence of his striking anyone prior to
the employment by the defendant or after his discharge
by the defendant.
The lower court held that under a prior Utah case,
Barney vs. Jewel Tea Company, 103 Ut. 595, 139 P2d
878 ( 1943), that at the time the employee struck the
plaintiff he was not acting within the scope of his employment, however, the trial court submitted to the jury
the question of whether or not the defendant was negligent in selecting or retaining this employee.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING A
VERDICT OF NON SUIT AT THE END OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
The plaintiff in this action presented a case with
facts very similar to those raised in a prior Utah case of
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Barney vs. Jewel Tea Company, 103 Ut. 595, 139 P2d
878 ( 1943).
In the Jewel Tea Company case the court was presented with a corporation which was engaged in the
business of selling merchandise through agents who
called at the homes of individuals. This merchandise
consisted mostly of grocery products.
The company had in its employ as an agent going
from house to house, a Mr. Davis, who in the process of
his duties of selling and collecting for the company became entangled in an altercation with one of the customers over the payment of an account. The plaintiff in this
case refused to make further installment payments until
the agent had properly credited her account; the agent
became angered and precipitated the plaintiff into a
rock garden and there followed a general physical contest in which the plaintiff suffered physical injuries.
The court discussed the rule of a principal being
liable for a tort committed by its agent when said tort
was done during the course of his employment, even
though the act resulting in the tort was not in the
furtherance of the principal's interest or duties entrusted
to the agent. Justice Wade, speaking for the court, on
page 879, in commenting on the California Rule which
holds the principal liable for the torts committed by an
agent during the course of his employment had this
to say:
"We believe the better rule to be that a principal
is not liable for the wilful tort of an agent which is
committed during the course of his employment
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unless it is committed in the furtherance of his employer's interest
or unless the employment is
such that the use of force could be' ,contemplated in
its accomplishment."
The court in supporting the above rule quoted Moskins Stores, Inc., vs. DeHart <Ind.) 29 NE 2d 948-9;
Mecham on Agency, 2nd Ed. Vol. 2, Sec. 1978, pp. 154043; and American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Agency, Vol. 1, Sec. 245, pp. 547, 548.
In a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Wolfe, the
Justice summed up the basic principals underlying the
decision wherein he said on Page 882:

"If, then, we accept the thesis which seems the best
justification for the doctrine of respondeat superior
i.e. master as cause for the injury in that he started
the servant on his course, in cases of wilful tort or
the wilful invasion of plaintiff's person by force,
the master cannot be held to be the cause where
there is a departure from the employment or, if no
departure, the agent is not acting for what he conceives to be for the master's interests but for the
purpose of venting his spleen on the plaintiff even
though the spleen arose from transactions which
were in the course of the employment. Whether we
think of force used for personal purposes as not
being within the realm of apprehensibility or because
it itself breaks the chain of causation leading back to
the master makes no difference. The result is the
same. Under the facts of this cas~ Davis in his use
of force was not acting to advance the interests of
his master nor to accomplish objects within the line

5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of his duties and the action of the appellant in sending him on his course was not in any sense a legal
cause of the assault. I, therefore, concur."

It might be noted that in the Jewel Tea Company
case all the Supreme Court Judges concurred in the
decision.
In comparing the facts of the case before us with
the above said Jewel Tea Company case, we find stronger
argument for holding the principal liable in the Jewel Tea
Case, on the basis that in the present case, the employee
of the defendant lumber company had no duty to collect
accounts. His duties were merely those of delivery of
lumber products and to present a good impression upon
the customers of said company. However, it is a logical
assumption that an agent given the duty of collecting,
as in the Jewel Tea Company case, would. be more apt
to run into altercations with the principal's customers.
It must be remembered also, that in the present case the
altercation seems to have arisen from some personal question as to the intelligence or abilities of the defendant's
employee, which would have no bearing or connection
with the lumber company's business. A final fact which
was brought out in the trial court to even further strengthen the defendant lumber company's case, was that when
the altercation commenced, the defendant's employee had
finished unloading the ordered materials and was preparing to depart, <Transcript, page 19).
The defendant in this case, at the close of plaintiff's
case, requested on the basis of the Jewel Tea Company
case and the facts presented by the plaintiff, that the defendant be granted a non suit. The trial court refused the
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same and it is defendant's contention that in so doing
erred.
POINT II:
THE COURT ERRED IN THAT THERE WAS
NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PLAINTIFF FOR THE QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE
TO BE SUBMITTED TO A JURY.
In consideration of the foregoing Point No. I, if the
trial court was correct in not applying the case of the
Barney vs. Jewel Tea Company, 103 Ut. 595, 139 P2d 878
<1943), and if said court, as a result thereof, did not err
when it refused to grant defendant's motion for non suit,
then it can be assumed it was proper to consider the
question of whether or not the defendant was negligent
in hiring the employee Marlin Morris, if it knew or should
have known, that said individual was of a vicious nature
and temperament.
In
considering the question of negligence of defendant's hiring of a vicious natured employee, it is the
defendant's contention in this case, that if this question
is to be considered, there was not sufficient evidence
presented by the plaintiff for the matter to go before the
jury. The plaintiff in this case offered the contested
testimony of the brother of the plaintiff, Ronald Stone,
who claimed that the yard foreman, Darlis Youngberg,
of the defendant lumber company, had told him that they
had had trouble with the employee, Marlin Morris, on a
prior occasion. The recorded testimony as given by the
brother, as to this admission of bad temperament of
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defendant's employee is on pages 32 and 33 of the Transcript and is as follows:
"A ..... He said, 'he is kind of hot headed. I warned
him before.' . . . . . ''
Plaintiff further offered, over the objection of the
defendant, testimony of a subsequent employer of the
employee, Marlin Morris, who testified as to the employee
being hot tempered. The said testimony of the subsequent
employer appears on page 115 of the Transcript and the
pertinent quotation is as follows:

"Q. Did you ever see him (Marlin Morris) personally strike anybody?
A. I haven't seen him strike, but I had to separate
him from, I would say hitting a man once, threatened
to, but he didn't actually do it."

It should be noted that this is the only evidence
presented by the plaintiff in this case to show a vicious
nature on the part of defendant's employee and the
plaintiff offered no testimony showing that this employee
had on any occasion, prior to or subsequent to the assault
complained of, struck or attacked any other individual.
In construing the plaintiff's case in the most favorable light and if the testimony of the plaintiff's brother
is to be believed rather than the defendant's employee
who denied making any admission to plaintiff's brother,
(Transcript, page 66), the most that plaintiff can argue
is that defendant's employee Marlin Morris, may have
been hot tempered. This being the case, the question is:
Is this enough to show negligence on the part of the
employer? It is important to note that the general author-
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ities speaking on this question do not follow a theory of
hot temperedness, but more of a violent and vicious
nature.
34 A.L.R. 2d 390 ( 1954), sets forth the rule of an
employer's negligence in selection or retention of an
employee:
"As has already been noted, a duty imposed upon
an employer who invites the general public to his
premises, and whose employees are brought into
contact with the members of such public in the
course of the master's business, is that of exercising
reasonable care for the safety of his customers, patrons, or other invitees. It has been held that in
fulfilling such duty, an employer must use due care
to avoid the selection or retention of an employee
whom he knows or should know is a person unworthy, by habits, temperament, or nature, to deal with
the persons invited to the premises by the employer.
The employer's knowledge of past acts of impropriety, violence, or disorder on the part of the employee
is generally considered sufficient to forewarn the
employer who selects or retains such employee in
his service that he may eventually commit an assault,
although not every infirmity of character, such, for
example, as dishonesty or querulousness, will lead
to such result . ..... "

Note that in the rule as stated by the quotation from
A.L.R. 2d above that which has been underlined points
out that an employer's knowledge of past acts of violence
on the part of an employee will generally b~ considered
sufficient to forewarn, however, the mere character of
quarrelsomeness does not seem enough to fasten liability.
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This comparison of a hot tempered employee to one
of violent or vicious nature is considered in 6 Am. Jur.
2d Assault and Battery Sec. 134 p. 113:
"Pursuant to the general theory that an employer
is bound to exercise reasonable care for the safety
of his customers, patrons, or other invitees, with
whom an employee ,may come in contact on the
employer's premises or in connection with the employer's business, it is generally recognized that an
employer may be held liable for an assault or battery
committed by his employee against a customer,
patron, or invitee, if he has selected or retained in
his employment an employee whose violent propensities were known, or should have been known, to
him, and a causal connection can be shown between
the employer's negligence in the selection of his employee and the tort committed by the employee.

"
The words used again imply far more than merely
a quarrelsome or hot tempered nature and it will be noted
that the nature of an employee for liability to fasten upon
the employer, as used above, is violent propensities.
Prosser, Prosser on Torts, (2 Ed.) Sec. 63, pp. 354,
353, implies that this duty owed by an employer to his
customers is mainly confined to certain industries:
" . . . . . It may be said, in general, that the master
may be liable for assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, defamation, or misrepresentations made by the servant, where the employment is of a kind likely to lead to such torts, or
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to furnish an opportunity and incentive for them,
and the servant. is motivated at least in part by a
desire to serve the master. Thus, a railway ticket
agent who assaults, arrests and slanders a passenger,
in the belief that he has been given a piece of counterfeit money, is within the scope of his employment,
although the employer has not authorized such conduct. But if he acts from purely personal motives,
because of a quarrel not in the employer's interests,
he is considered to have departed from his employment, and the master is not liable.
Even where the servant's ends are entirely personal,
the master may be under such a duty to the plaintiff
that responsibility for the servant's acts may not be
delegated to him. This is true, in particular, in those
cases in which the master, by contract or otherwise,
has entered into some relation requiring him to be
responsible for the protection of the plaintiff. It is
on this basis, for example, that carriers, innkeepers
and hospitals have been held liable for personal attacks made by, their servants on their premises. The
only justification for such a result is that the great
responsibility undertaken requires that the master
shall, at his peril, choose servants who will not commit such torts."
Certainly by no stretch of the imagination can a
truck driver deliveryman fit into the industries mentioned
by Prosser above.
In the area of case law supporting the rule on the
question of an employer's negligence in selecting or retaining a servant with known vicious propensities, there
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have been some recent supporting decisions. In a leading
case considering the above theory, Murray vs. Modoc
State Bank 181 Kan. 642, 313 P2d 304 ( 1957), there was
the fact situation of a bank branch manager assaulting
and thereby injuring a customer of said bank. In this
case, the branch manager had been employed by the
defendant bank for approximately two years and during
said employment he had assaulted the plaintiff Murray
on one occasion in the bank; the branch manager of the
defendant had become so antagonistic to the plaintiff that
the plaintiff refused to continue his banking transactions
except by mail. This irritated the defendant's employee
so that the employee went to the home of the plaintiff and
during an altercation over the plaintiff's banking by mail,
the employee for the second time assaulted and injured
the plaintiff. It was shown in the trial court that the employer had knowledge of this antagonism between the
branch manager and the plaintiff and was aware of the
first assault of the branch manager upon the plaintiff.
It should be further noted that at the time the said
branch manager went to the plaintiff's home the altercation thereafter was concerning and over plaintiff's banking practices. With the facts before it in this case, the
court overruled the demure to plaintiff's petition alleging
that the plaintiff had a cause of action.
Justice Schroeder speaking for the court on page 309
had this to say as to the theory of the case:
"We hold that the doctrine of respondeat superior
is not involved in the instant case. Construing the
pleading most favorably to the petitioner as we must,
the issue presented is whether the employer, the
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Modoc State Bank, was negligent in retaining its
managing officer, Breithaupt, who had propensities
toward violence."
Notice that the court used the word violence and as
the facts pointed out in this case there was no question
of a violent propensity on the part of the employee, and
the employer defendant was certainly forewarned of such
violent nature when the employee assaulted the plaintiff
the first time. Thus we see a case where the rule was
supported, but in supporting said rule, the court did so
with evidence showing a violent nature in the employee,
a prior occasion of violent assault by said employee upon
the plaintiff in defendant's bank and that the employee
assaulted the plaintiff because of a difference of opinion
as to the proper banking methods to be followed by the
plaintiff. The court in its discussion cites many other
cases to support the rule, however, it will be noted that
these cases all were of employees with extreme violent and
vicious natures.
The Modoc State Bank case cited a case which did
not meet the requirements for finding a negligent employer as to the above rule. This was the case of Balin
vs. Lysle Rishel Post No. 68, American Legion, 177 Kan.
520, 280 P2d 623 ( 1955). In this case the court was presented with the fact situation whereby an- employee was
accidentally shot by another employee of a defendant
hotel keeper. It was brought out in the trial court that
the defendant hotel keeper had knowledge that the employee causing the injury to the plaintiff was in the habit
of keeping a .22 rifle in his room and on prior occassions
had actually shot at birds from a hotel window. The only

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence presented by plaintiff that the defendant employer had knowledge of any misconduct of its employee
was the defendant's knowledge of the shooting at pigeons
from the hotel windows, and the fact that the employee
had repaired some firearms in the checkroom of the hotel.
The plaintiff prese~ted its case on the theory that the
defendant was negligent in retaining an employee who it
knew had worked on firearms in the checkroom and shot
pigeons from the window. In support of its contention,
the plaintiff cited cases involving an employer being held
liable where its employee had been known to have made
previous assaults on guests, a case of an employee having
an unusual and abnormally high temper, a case where an
employee was prone to engage in the act of dangerous
horseplay and where an employee worked for an apartment house was known to be a drunkard, incompetent~
and dangerous.
Justice Thiele, speaking for the court on page 630
pointed out that the evidence before the court did not
show negligence on the part of the employer:

"If it be assumed, as plaintiff contends, that at the
time of the shooting he was not then in the relation
of servant to the master, the corporation, and that
the rule is that a master may be liable for injuries
to a third person which are the direct results of the
incompetence or unfitness of his servant, either where
he was negligent in employing him or in retaining
him when the master knew or should have known
of such incompetence or unfitness, and we need not
expend on that rule, see 57 C.J.S., master and servant,
section 559, page 270, 35 Am. Jur. 978, the evidence
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now under consideration does not show that the
master corporation hired an incompetent or unfit
servant or employee, or that it retained him in employment after it knew or should have known of his
incompetence or unfitness - it does not even show
the servant incompetent or unfit..... "
The above court finding insufficient evidence of
negligence on the part of the employer affirmed a ruling
for the defendant.
The State of Washington faced with this question
of negligence of an employer in selecting or retaining a
vicious employee, LaLone vs. Smith 39 Wash. 2d 167,
234 P2d 893 ( 1951 ) , supported the rule but once again
this was a case whereby the employer had knowledge of
a violent temper, prior assaults on tenants of the defendant and of the employee's drunkenness while on the premises of the defendant. In this case, the evidence showed
that after the defendant employer had been forewarned
of an assault committed by his employee that the employee at a later date in a drunken rage assaulted plaintiff
inflicting serious personal injuries upon him. With these
facts and evidence before the court, the defendant could
not deny that it had warning of employee's vicious propensities. Chief Justice Schwellenbach, stating the holding of the court affirming the judgment of the trial ,court
on page 897, had this to say:
"To the facts of this case, as found by the trial
court, we must apply the rule of law that an employer is liable to a third person for injuries inflicted upon
him by an employee who has been retained in employment after the employer knows, or ought to
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know, that because of his vicious temperament or
propensities he is likely to assault persons during
the course of his employment. See 35 Am. Jur. 1006,
master and servant, Sec. 573."
Notice again that the court based its finding on
evidence showing undisputable prior knowledge of employee's temperament, an employee of a vicious temperament prone to heavy drinking. This again points out the
difference between a mere characteristic of quick temper
and that of a vicious and dangerous temperament; certainly there is no comparison between the two and in
construing these characteristics the same, a proper theory
of law may be stretched beyond its proper boundaries.
Another recent case which cites both the LaLone
vs. Smith case and the Murray vs. Modoc State Bank
case is the Svacek vs. Shelley ____ Alaska ____________ , 359 P2d
127 <1961). In this case, a tenant of the employer was
seriously injured by an assault by an employee of the
defendant. The evidence brought forth at the trial court
brought out that the defendant had been warned of the
employee's reputation of a "knifer" and as being a vicious
person. This reputation of the employee of the defendant
was further supported by witnesses who testified as to
the employee being a "knifer" prior to the assault upon
the plaintiff. Defendant even admitted of having knowledge of the employee being in a fight on her premises
and of the prior warnings of his being dangerous. Here
again we find a case supporting the rule of negligence on
the part of an employer in selecting or retaining a vicious
employee, however, the evidence once again showed not
a mere question of temper but a disposition which was

16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dangerous and had on prior occasions been demonstrated
to the defendant employer as such.
Other jurisdictions have faced the problem of this
rule and decided cases on the same basic extent of evidence. The case of Fleming vs. Brofin -------- App. D.C.
····--------, 104 Atlantic 2d 407 ( 1954), held against a
plaintiff housewife who was assaulted by a deliveryman
for a defendant grocery store. The evidence brought forth
that there was nd prior information to put the defendant
on notice of the dangerous nature of the employee and
that the defendant's investigation consisted of no more
than telephoning a prior employer where the employee
had previously worked.
In another case of Porter vs. Thompson 357 Mo. 31,
206 SW 2d 509 <1947), where an employee of the defendant shot the husband of the plaintiff in a restaurant
where the employee went during his working hours. This
case was considered on the heretofore said rule of employer's negligence as stated above and the court found in
favor of the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff had
to show that defendant knew or should have known of
the employee's vicious propensities. It was brought out
that the employee on prior occasions in the same restaurant had been rude and threatening to customers and this
had been so reported to the police but not the defendant,
and further, on one occasion had threatened to kill a
janitor for a car loading company, and that the same had
been reported to the employer of said employee. The
court supported the defendant's position on the basis that
there was not sufficient evidence to show defendant knew
or should have known of its employee's dangerous and
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VIcious propensities. Justice Bradley speaking for the
court on page 512 summed up the court's holding for the
defendant as follows:
"Under the law it is quite clear that plaintiff did
not make a submissable case under the rule of respondeat superior. Did she make a submissable case
on the theory that respondeat was negligent in employing a watchman of vicious propensities and that
such negligence was a proximate cause of the death
of plaintiff's husband? As above stated, if it be assumed that Robinson was of vicious propensities,
that alone would not make respondeat liable. The
burden was on plaintiff to show that respondeat
knew or should have known Robinson's propensities,
and there was no substantial evidence tending to
show so ...... "
In consideration of the above cases both for and
against the rule of an employer's selecting or retaining a
servant who it knew or should have known of the dangerous propensities of the servant, it is clear that the cases
holding for the rule show a far greater degree of clear
and convincing evidence of defendant's knowlege than
has been presented in this case now on appeal. As stated
earlier, it would seem that in construing the plaintiff's
case in the most favorable light from the evidence presented at the trial court, all that could be said of the employee
of the defendant lumber company was that he may have
had a hot temper. Certainly this is far removed from the
vicious nature and character of the employees in the cases
which have held for the plaintiffs in the heretofore said
rule. The evidence in this case shows an employee who
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was hired through the Employment Security Office
<Transcript, p. 87), as defendant had done before for
many years without any incidents and who had no
knowledge of any prior bad disposition on the part of
the employee; and that during the short nine to twelve
day period of the employee's employment with the lumber
company, there was no evidence of any true vicious
nature and in fact any evidence that the defendant had
any trouble with the employee was strongly contested
by defendant's employees, <Transcript, p. 63, 78, 102,
and 109). It must be remembered that plaintiff at no
time gave any evidence of the employee physically assaulting an individual prior to or after the assault of
which plaintiff complains. It would appear from prior
cases that plaintiff in order to recover would need evidence of more vicious and dangerous characteristics on
the part of this employee, prior to or during his employment with the defendant lumber company.
POINT III:
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE JURY
TO FIND IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT IV:
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE AS TO EMPLOYEE
MARLIN MORRIS' SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT.
The trial court in allowing a subsequent employer
to testify that the employee of the defendant showed a
nature of a hot temper was highly prejudicial and did
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not show that the defendant had any knowledge or should
have known of the employee's disposition.

POINT V:
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES TO BE A'W ARDED.
In 6 Am. Jur. 2d. Sec. 187, p. 154, the general rule
for the awarding of punitive damages is laid out as
follows:
"As a general rule, punitive damages are awarded in
addition to compensatory damages where an assault
and battery is committed in a wanton and malicious
manner or under other circumstances of aggrevation."

If in fact it could be held that the defendant was
negligent in the hiring and retention of the employee in
this case, it would appear unjust to say that its negligence
was wanton and malicious in manner. Certainly there
was no malice or a wanton reckless disregard of the rights
and safety of others or gross negligence on the part of the
defendant. The facts and evidence in this case are hard
put to show the necessary elements of negligence alone.
CONCLUSION
In considering alLthe elements of this case, we find
that the record shows an employee not acting within the
scope of his employment, however, the question of his
being of violent and of dangerous nature was put in issue.
In repetition of what has been said before, looking at the
plaintiff's case in a most favorable light and believing
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only the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, the most
that can be said about this employee of the defendant
lumber company, is that he may have been of hot temper.
Was this enough to hold him to be of violent and dangerous propensities? It was the defendant's contention that it
was not; nor was it proper in allowing testimony of a
subsequent employer's prejudicial evidence to be introduced erroneously. It would appear from the cases which
would support plaintiff's position, that plaintiff had to
show a great deal more in the way of a dangerous individual than was shown in the instant case. Further, there was
no evidence introduced to show any knowledge or means
by which the employer could have known that this individual employee may have had a hot temper.
It is worthy of mention that some authorities have
considered the problem of scope of employment and negligence in the selection or retention of an employee together, and come to the conclusion that the two can not be
separated. In 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 134, p. 113, this view
is outlined:
" ..... Some authorities take the view, however, that
an employer's liability for negligence in the selection
or retention of an employee· can be asserted only
where the employee, in committing the tortuous act,
acted within the scope of his employment, and that,
since the employer is vicariously liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior for acts committed
by the employee within the scope of his employment,
the employer's liability on the ground of negligence
in the selection or retention of an employee is merely
a particular application of the employer's vicarious
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liability for acts committed by the employee within
the scope of his employment ..... "
The above is mentioned only to point out that if
the court is to distinguish this case from Barney vs. Jewel
Tea Company case then it may be according to some
authorities that there remains some connection to still
make the said Jewel Tea Case applicable in part to this
problem.
The defendant in the instant case has complied with
all the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it by
law and it is respectfully submitted that the verdict and
judgment of the District Court be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

DALE T. BROWNING
PHILLIP H. BROWNING
Attorneys for Defendant
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